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Anders E. B. Blomqvist
Local Motives for Deporting Jews
Economic Nationalizing in Szatmárnémeti in 1944
The article provides a case study of  Szatmárnémeti (Satu Mare, today in Romania) 
during World War II by using the concept of  economic nationalizing. I investigate the 
motifs behind the de-Jewifi cation and re-Hungarianization of  the city and show that 
by 1944 the Hungarian leaders were convinced not only that the seizure of  Jewish 
property would signifi cantly improve their own situation, but also that the gradual 
implementation of  this policy was the key reason for its previous failure. The article 
also discusses the ways in which the Hungarian elite aroused expectations among the 
Hungarian public that Jewish property would be redistributed as a “national gift” and 
the eagerness of  members of  practically all sectors of  Hungarian society to acquire 
property that had been left behind by the deported Jews. I thereby argue that the 
relatively strong local support behind the deportation of  Jews was driven, above all, 
by the economic interests of  the local Hungarian community. The entire economy of  
the city was de-Jewifi ed and re-Hungarianized when the Jews were deported in the 
summer of  1944. However, I also show that, ambitious plans for social redistribution 
notwithstanding, major redistribution of  assets took place primarily within the housing 
sector. In general, the gains of  the benefi ciaries were sharply exceeded by the human 
and material losses for the city as a whole.
Keywords: The Holocaust in Hungary, economic history, economic nationalism, ethnic 
borderlands
This article addresses the question of  responsibility and collaboration in the ethnic 
borderlands of  Hungary in World War II by using the concept of  economic 
nationalizing. The concept is applied to a case study of  the city of  Szatmárnémeti 
(Satu Mare, today in Romania, near the Hungarian–Romanian border) by using 
formerly unexplored sources. I will thus investigate how the “de-Jewifi cation” 
and “re-Hungarianization” of  Szatmárnémeti was implemented in 1944. This 
means examining why Hungarian leaders, authorities and civilians supported the 
deportation of  Jews. In other words, the account will not provide a comprehensive 
explanation of  the reasons for the murder of  the Jews by Nazi Germans (with 
the active collaboration of  Hungarians). Instead, I will concentrate primarily on 
the economic motives for Hungarian support of  the deportation and also on the 
closely interrelated question of  its actual economic impact.
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I defi ne economic nationalizing as an institution of  a social practice of  
economic and political principles and processes that infl uence and are infl uenced 
by nationalism and national identities. My approach to the study of  economic 
nationalizing is inspired by Paul Brass. It emphasizes the importance of  how 
ethnic and national identities are instrumentalized, constructed and used by 
the elite to gain political power and economic advantages. Ethnic identity and 
nationalism arise out of  specifi c interactions between the leaderships of  the 
nationalizing states and minority elites. Thus, ethnic and national identities 
are social and political constructs, which are created by elites who draw upon 
and distort cultural attributes for political and economic reasons.1 Economic 
nationalizing is a dynamic process, in which national and economic factors 
interact. To stress the dynamic aspect and the social force behind this process I 
use the term “nationalizing” (as well as Romanianizing, Hungarianizing) instead 
of  “nationalization.” 
The social practice of  economic nationalizing is discernible in formal and 
explicit ways, as in regulations or laws, or implicitly in the form of  social rules. One 
fundamental principle of  nationalism is to improve the political and economic 
positions of  the core members of  the nation relative to and at the expense 
of  members of  other nations and minorities. This defi nition of  economic 
nationalizing is inspired by Rogers Brubaker’s concept of  “a nationalizing state,” 
which he defi nes as a nation-state of and for a particular ethno-cultural nation—
the core nation—whose state promotes and protects their language, culture, 
demographic position, economic welfare and political hegemony.2
Economic nationalism has been a driving force in the region of  East-Central 
Europe since the nineteenth century, as consecutive regimes have striven to create 
ethno-national economies, including dualist Hungary and interwar Romania. 
The ruling nation usually used its political power to establish an ethnocracy to 
maximize economic advantages for itself  at the expense of  minorities. During 
the dualist period, the Jews of  Hungary were included in the ethnic category of  
Hungarian speakers (Magyars) with the aim of  Magyarizing the economy at the 
expense of  the so-called nationalities. So the economy of  Szatmárnémeti city 
was completely Magyarized during the dualist period. 3 
1  Paul Brass, Ethnic Groups and the State (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Book, 1985), 88–89.
2  Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63, 84, 88, 103.
3  Anders E. B. Blomqvist, Economic Nationalizing in the Ethnic Borderlands of  Hungary and Romania. Inclusion, 
Exclusion and Annihilation in Szatmár/Satu-Mare 1867–1944 (Stockholm: Department of  History, Stockholm 
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In 1920, the city was ceded to Romania and renamed Satu Mare, despite 
the fact that it had a large Hungarian-speaking majority, and a process of  
Romanianizing began. Romanianizing was radicalized at the beginning of  the 
1930s, and the public sector was almost completely Romanianized at the expense 
of  minorities and especially Jews. In the mid-1930s, efforts to Romanianize were 
focused on the core parts of  Romania, while the Jewish share of  the economy 
in the ethnic borderlands, such as Satu Mare, grew. In 1940, Romania underwent 
a major revision of  its borders. It lost Northern Transylvania (including Satu 
Mare), Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In the remaining parts of  Romania 
the Antonescu regime continued with Romanianization, with the intention of  
completely Romanianizing real estate, businesses and jobs, though in the end 
these efforts largely failed.4 
When northern Transylvania was ceded to Hungary in 1940, a process 
of  re-Hungarianization of  the economy was immediately launched. Re-
Hungarianization included redistributing economic assets and resources 
owned by Jews among so-called Christians, a practice that was referred to as 
de-Jewifi cation. However, in the Hungarian–Romanian borderland this process 
was intended also to strengthen the position of  Hungarians at the expense of  
Romanians. Szatmárnémeti had around 13,000 Jews out of  a total population of  
52,000. The majority of  the Jews were Orthodox, and the Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, 
the fi rst Grand Rebbe of  the Satmar Hasidic dynasty, had turned the city into 
an important Orthodox center. The generation of  Jews that had lived in the city 
during the Dualist period remained deeply attached to the Hungarian language 
and Hungarian culture, despite 20 years of  Romanian rule. Nonetheless, during 
World War II the category “Hungarian” excluded Jews on “racial” grounds and 
other nationalities, mainly Romanians, on linguistic grounds. Hungary imposed 
anti-Jewish legislation, but the implementation of  this legislation proceeded 
slowly.
The Hungarian elite in the city of  Szatmárnémeti aimed to remove Jews 
from the economy, while at the same time a political economy of  exploitation 
developed in which the Hungarian elite made large profi ts at the expense of  
Jews. Offi cially and legally so-called “straw man” arrangements were banned, 
but in reality leading Hungarians were profi ting from this type of  arrangement. 
The straw man (stróman from the German Strohmann) or Aladár was typically a 
University, 2014), 155–60.
4  Ştefan Christian Ionescu, Jewish Resistance to “Romanianization”, 1940–44 (New York: Palgrave, 2015), 
184.
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Hungarian Christian who, in an effort to circumvent the anti-Jewish legislation, 
formally took over Jewish businesses in exchange for a share of  their profi ts.5 
As a result of  the pro-Magyar attitudes of  leading Jews in the Dualist period 
and during the interwar period, some of  them were defi ned as Hungarians and 
exempted from the anti-Jewish laws. One important example was the Princz 
family, who were one of  the wealthiest Jewish families in the city and owners of  
the Princz factory. They were exempted because they “had behaved patriotically 
with regards to the Hungarian cause” during the interwar Romanian period, i.e. 
they had supported Hungarian irredentism and ethnic Hungarian politics and 
the ethnic Hungarian economy and culture.  Armin Princz, the head of  the 
family, had been a leader of  the ethnic Hungarian party in the interwar period. 
This means that some leading Jews and Hungarians were collaborating on the re-
Hungarianization of  the economy, which clearly adds to the complexity of  the 
situation.6 According to the law, these Jews fell under the anti-Jewish legislation, 
but they were exempted because of  their national merits.
 On March 19, 1944, Nazi Germany occupied Hungary. The occupation was 
motivated in part by the fact that the Hungarian government had tried to negotiate 
an armistice with the Allies. A second reason was that the “Jewish question” in 
Hungary remained “unresolved” according to the Nazi German criteria. The 
situation of  Jews in Hungary had been deteriorating up to 1944, but the large 
majority of  Jews was still alive despite the fact that tens of  thousands had been 
killed in instances of  mass murder. Additionally, Jews possessed a signifi cant 
share of  the Hungarian economy, as they did, for instance, in Szatmárnémeti, 
despite ever more severe discrimination. The re-Hungarianization process hit 
primarily the lower and middle class stratum of  Jews, while more wealthy Jews 
were able to maintain their positions.
 Nazi Germany’s plan for eliminating the Jews in occupied Hungary was 
to expropriate and deport them with the assistance of  Hungarian leaders and 
authorities. Nazi German leaders’ targeting of  Hungarian Jews was part of  their 
larger Final Solution, which aimed at a complete de-Jewifi cation and the killing 
of  Jews in territories under Nazi control. Still, leading Nazi Germans took 
personal advantage of  the situation and were occasionally willing to spare the 
lives of  individual Jews in exchange for large bribes. 
5  Blomqvist, Economic Nationalizing in the Ethnic Borderlands of  Hungary and Romania, 355–58.
6  Ibid., 336.
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The German occupation and takeover of  Hungary went quickly and smoothly. 
The Hungarian regent Miklós Horthy remained in power and appointed a pro-
German Prime Minister, Döme Sztójay. A group of  600 Germans under the 
leadership of  Adolf  Eichmann arrived to implement the Final Solution.7 The 
area east of  the river Tisza, including Szatmárnémeti, was declared a war zone 
under German command.8 The declaration of  war zone was a way of  legitimizing 
the deportation of  the “internal enemies,” i.e. one of  its functions was to help 
strengthen the image of  the Jews as enemies who supported communism. The 
plan was fi rst to deport Jews from this eastern territory because the front and 
the Red Army were advancing westward.
Hungarian and German interests overlapped in their desire to remove the 
Jews. In a perverse misuse of  a term that in principle refers to religious belief, 
the Hungarian authorities used the word “Christian” to exclude Jews on a racial 
basis. The inclusion of  the Romanians in the privileged category of  “Christians” 
reduced the Hungarian–Romanian tensions, as the Romanians were not 
discriminated against de jure. Still, the Hungarian leaders regarded Hungarian 
ethno-national interests as paramount. I will therefore use the term “Hungarian” 
when referring to a person who was defi ned by the law as non-Jewish, although 
the Hungarian authorities admittedly employed the term “Christian.”
Economic and National Motives of  the Holocaust
Research on the Holocaust in general has pointed to the importance of  
economic and national factors. Martin Dean has argued that the confi scation 
of  Jewish property was linked to the physical process of  destruction.9 Several 
historians have applied a functional approach to explaining the Holocaust in 
Hungary, stressing the importance of  economic and class factors.10 Historians 
7  Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vági, Self-Financing Genocide: the Gold Train, the Becher Case and the Wealth of  
Hungarian Jews (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 85–86.
8  Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL) [National Archives of  Hungary], 150 IV. k.fő 
30 tétel Szatmárnémeti, 773–74, 789.
9  Martin Dean, Robbing the Jews: The Confi scating of  Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933–1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2, 16.
10  Götz Aly and Christian Gerlach, Das letzte Kapitel: Der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944–1945 
(Frankfurt: Fischer-Taschenbuch, 2002), 186-ff, 212-ff.; Tatjana Tönsmeyer, “The Robbery of  Jewish 
Property in Eastern European States Allied With Nazi Germany,” in Robbery and Restitution, ed. M. Dean et al. 
(New York: Berghahn, 2007), 81–98; Krisztián Ungváry, “Robbing the Dead: The Hungarian Contribution 
to the Holocaust,” in Facing the Nazi Genocide: non-Jews and Jews in Europe, ed. B. Kosmala and F. Tych (Berlin: 
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Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vági have described the looting of  Jewish property 
as a “self-fi nancing genocide,” since the Hungarian state used the property 
to pay for the deportations and the mass killing of  Jews.11 Krisztián Ungváry 
stresses in his latest major study on the Horthy period that “cold and rational 
economic calculations” lay behind the deportations.12 Ungváry claimed that 
Hungarian authorities framed the solution to the so-called Jewish question as a 
“major social transformation” through the full-scale Hungarianization of  Jewish 
property.13 Other historians, such as Mária M. Kovács and Victor Karády, have 
concluded that economic anti-Semitism initially developed during the interwar 
period, alongside confl icting economic-occupational interests and social class 
competition between Jews and Christians over material resources.14
Michael Mann contended that without Nazi German power, the Jewish 
genocide would not have been attempted in Hungary, even though almost all local 
perpetrators were Hungarian. The Hungarian regime saw the ethnic cleansing of  
the country as desirable primarily for economic reasons, but was divided over 
the means. Mann argues that the core perpetrators were ideologically motivated 
by nationalism, defi ned in ethnic and racial terms, but when the cleansing took 
the form of  violent deportation, this created massive opportunities for profi t. 
Many Hungarians were thereby sucked in by materialistic motives that were 
legitimized by state agencies.15
Regarding the expropriation of  Jewish assets during the Second World War, 
Kádár and Vági have argued that the Hungarian government was successful 
in looting but almost completely failed to organize the redistribution. Thus, 
the looting, of  the Jews could not alleviate the economic problems faced by 
the Hungarian “nation,” even though this was one of  the policy aims.16 Kádár 
and Vági believe, moreover, that this re-allocation scheme of  Jewish jobs and 
property, which included about one-fi fth of  the national wealth, could have 
Metropol, 2004), 231–61; Michael Mann, The Dark Side of  Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 298–301.
11  Kádár and Vági, Self-Financing Genocide.
12  Krisztián Ungváry, A Horthy-rendszer mérlege: Diszkrimináció, szociálpolitika és antiszemitizmus Magyországon 
1919–1944 (Pécs–Budapest: Jelenkor, 2013), 606. 
13  Krisztián Ungváry, “‘Nagy jelentőségű szociálpolitikai akció’ – adalékok a zsidó vagyon begyűjtéséhez 
és elosztásához Magyarországon 1944-ben,” in 1956-os Intézet Évkönyv, 10 (Budapest: n.p., 2002), 287–321.
14  Victor Karady, The Jews of  Europe in the Modern Era (Budapest; Central European University Press, 
2004), 321; Mária Kovács, Liberal Professions and Illiberal Politics: Hungary from the Habsburgs to the Holocaust 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
15  Mann, The Dark Side of  Democracy, 302.
16  Kádár and Vági, Self-Financing Genocide, 85.
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resulted in better living standards and an economic upturn for non-Jewish 
Hungarians; however, because of  the chaotic wartime conditions, the scheme 
had the opposite effect, further eroding the Hungarian economy and society.17
Studies on the factors of  economic anti-Semitism and nationalism have 
focused relatively little on the annexed territories, including Northern Transylvania 
in 1940–44, despite the fact that the physical destruction of  Jews was more 
thorough there than in the core areas of  Hungary.18 One notable exception is 
the work of  historian Ferenc Sz. Horváth, in which he examined the role of  
social compensation, economic reparation and the politics of  resettlement in 
Northern Transylvania. He claims that ethnic Hungarians aimed to regain the 
economic positions that Jews had taken during the period of  Romanian rule, 
i.e. they sought to implement economic re-Hungarianization.19 Horváth’s study 
included examples from Nagyvárad (today Oradea in Romania) and Kolozsvár 
(today Cluj in Romania), but not Szatmárnémeti. Apart from Horvath’s article 
on the topic, there is no study using primary sources on the implementation of  
anti-Jewish legislation in Northern Transylvania for the period 1940–44.20 
In order to grasp the mechanisms and motivations behind the deportation of  
Jews, a local case study is warranted that draws on a variety of  sources, including 
offi cial documentation, newspaper articles and oral testimonies. Kádár, Vági and 
Horváth have made important contributions in this direction, but their inquiries 
hardly represent detailed investigations of  the local scene. Rather, they draw on 
bits and pieces of  information from various places. This article therefore aims 
to address this lacuna by undertaking a local investigation in order to arrive at 
a more subtle understanding of  the mechanisms of  deportation by using the 
analytical concept of  economic nationalizing.  
17  Kádár and Vági, “‘Solving the Jewish Question’ versus the ‘Interests of  the Production’,”  in The 
Holocaust in Hungary: A European Perspective, ed. J. Molnár (Budapest: Balassi, 2005), 518–31 (530).
18  For the Subcarpathian area, see Yeshayahu Jelinek, The Carpathian Diaspora: The Jews of  Subcarpathian 
Rus’ and Mukachevo 1848–1948 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2007).
19  Ferenc Horváth, “Népcsoportpolitika, szociális kompenzáció és gazdasági jóvátétel,” Múltunk 3 
(2006): 102–43.
20  Historical overviews on the history of  Jews in Transylvania have only sporadic information about 
economic issues. See Ladislau Gyémánt, Jews of  Transylvania: A Historical Destiny (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian 
Cultural Institute, 2004); Attila Gidó, On Transylvanian Jews: An Outline of  a Common History (Cluj-Napoca: 
Institutul pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităţilor Naţionale, 2009); T. Friling et al., eds., International 
Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Final Report (Bucharest: Polirom, 2005); Béla Vago, “The Destruction 
of  the Jews of  Transylvania”, in Hungarian-Jewish Studies, ed. R. Braham (New York: World Federation of  
Hungarian Jews, 1966), 171–221; Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger, A zsidóság története Erdélyben (1623–1944) 
(Budapest: MTA Judaisztikai Kutatócsoport, 1995).
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The Final Solution
The German plans for a radical solution of  the so-called Jewish question 
received support among Hungarian leaders and authorities. Hungarian leaders 
were interested in the possibility of  deporting Jews, as this would enable them to 
fully implement their program of  re-Hungarianization. In the context of  a war 
economy plagued by shortages, Hungarian leaders aroused expectations among 
the Hungarian public that Jewish property would be redistributed as a “national 
gift.” Expectations were high that this would amount to the “salvation of  the 
Hungarian economy.” 
The majority of  Hungarians in Szatmárnémeti were not aware of  the plan 
to annihilate Jewry, but we can assume that the leading Hungarians, including 
Mayor László Csóka, had been informed and knew of  the extermination camps. 
State secretary László Endre attended the meeting in Szatmárnémeti at the end 
of  April, at which plans were made for the establishment of  the ghetto and 
the deportation of  Jews. We can assume that during this meeting Csóka asked 
Endre about the destination of  the Jews. Lower-ranking offi cials most probably 
understood that the Jews would face harsh conditions, but we can assume that 
they were not given specifi c information about their fi nal destination.21 They 
proved willing to support the deportations, as they expected to receive economic 
returns in the form of  “Jewish property.”
Until March 1944, the various anti-Jewish measures that had been passed 
primarily affected poor Jews, as some of  the more affl uent Jews had succeeded 
in maintaining their economic positions and wealth. Still, around 1,000 Jews, 
mainly refugees from Poland, had been deported from Szatmárnémeti because 
they lacked documentation necessary in order to obtain Hungarian citizenship. 
Together with around 24,000 other Jews, they had been massacred near 
Kamianets-Podolskyi, a city that today lies in western Ukraine, in the fall of  
1941.22 
Wealthy Jews were still visible in society at the beginning of  1944, which 
increased the support for a more radical solution among Hungarian leaders, 
including the mayor. At the beginning of  March, the number of  Jewish tradesmen 
and craftsmen was 980, which represented 41 percent of  all active permits. The 
21  Randolph L. Braham, Genocide and Retribution: the Holocaust in Hungarian-ruled Northern Transylvania 
(Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1983), 77–78.
22  Ágnes Hegyi and Dániel Lőwy, “Szatmárnémeti,” in A magyarországi holokauszt földrajzi enciklopédiája, 
vol. 2, ed. R. Braham (Budapest: Park, 2007), 1039–48 (1044). 
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city’s economy relied on Jewish managers and engineers. Furthermore, several 
larger Jewish industries that produced goods necessary for the war economy were 
still in operation. The local newspaper concluded on April 6 that in 1940–1943, 
“we succeeded in convincing the majority to favor the Christian Hungarians,” 
but that “the real reorganization begins now.”23 
Elisabeth Heimfeld, a Jewish survivor, stated that in April 1944 she and 
members of  her community felt that “something was coming for the Jews.”24 
Polish Jewish refugees living in the city urged Jews to “run away, everyone will 
die!”25 Rivka Handler, a Jewish eyewitness, stated that Polish Jews were telling 
“unbelievable horror stories,” but “we still could not imagine mass killings.”26 
Most Jews thought these reports were exaggerated. In any case, even if  they were 
considering leaving the city, it was extremely diffi cult to fi nd a place where they 
would be able to take refuge.27 Many Jews were convinced that “the Hungarians 
won’t let us down” and that atrocities “will not happen to us, because we are 
Hungarian Jews.”28 
However, at the beginning of  April, the Hungarian Ministry of  Interior, 
together with the Nazi German special appointee Adolf  Eichmann, worked 
out the details of  relocating the Jews to ghettos.29 The offi cial arguments for 
establishing so-called “designated areas” or ghettos were based on economic 
and security reasoning. The Hungarian Minister of  Interior Andor Jaross argued 
that Jews lived in better lodgings than non-Jews because they were unjustly 
richer, and therefore should be moved to designated areas with poor housing. 
Furthermore, for supposed reasons of  national security, Jaross required Jews to 
be transferred from villages and smaller towns to larger cities, where authorities 
could supervise them in designated areas.30 According to the plan, during each 
phase Jews would be subjected to special investigation in order to ensure that 
they would surrender their valuables.31 
23  Szamos, April 6, 1944, 6.
24  University of  Southern California (USC) Shoah Foundation Institute (SFI), testimony 8680.
25  USC SFI, testimonies 18970, 21264, 24194, 25815, 29247, 31262, 50370, tape 2. 
26  Rivka Handler, We, The Fugitives: The Dramatic Story of  a Young Family’s Escape from the Holocaust (New 
York: Rivka Handler, 1988), 17.
27  USC SFI, testimony 14902.
28  USC SFI, testimonies 13361, 24194.
29  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 16–17.
30  International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Final Report, 262.
31  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 17.
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The security argument was specious and deluded, as Jews in general were 
not organizing any armed resistance. In Szatmárnémeti only two guns were 
found in the possession of  Jews, though the city had around 13,000 Jewish 
inhabitants.32 Nonetheless, the city’s police kept the Jews under surveillance. In 
early 1944, they caught some Jews operating an illegal printing press used for 
printing falsifi ed civil and military documents, including ration cards.33 Most of  
the Jews of  the city were highly religious and did not engage in violence, even 
to defend themselves. Falsifi cation of  documents was the most defi ant form of  
resistance among Jews. 
One of  the fi rst measures in the plan was the April 11 announcement 
that all Jews would be dismissed from their jobs between April and September 
without compensation. This was meant to be part of  a gradual process that 
would “not disturb production.”34 The announcement made no mention of  the 
“designated areas.” However, the Hungarian authorities started to round up Jews 
in the neighboring district of  Carpatho-Ruthenia as early as April 16.35 
The mayor issued a decree on April 17 according to which all Jewish shops, 
with the exception of  food stores, were to be closed.36 Although the decree was 
issued on April 17, the authorities started to close shops at six o’clock in the 
morning of  April 16. Within a few days, the Hungarian authorities had taken 
the fi rst step in the process of  expropriation and relocation, by closing the 
350 Jewish shops, which represented more than half  of  all shops in the city.37 
As the second step, the Hungarian state formally seized these shops on April 
21.38 The authorities reported that this was the end of  the “straw man system,” 
i.e. the collusive system of  circumventing anti-Jewish laws.39 Thus, this major 
operation to nationalize Jewish commercial property successfully de-Jewifi ed 
the commercial sector. However, the process of  re-Hungarianization had only 
started, as most of  the shops remained closed and were only gradually reopened 
under new and exclusively Hungarian-Christian management. 
32  “Szatmár zsidótlanitása,” Szamos, May 15, 1944, 4.
33  MNL OL, K 149 BM PT1 651/2 73 doboz 1941-7-6000 651.f. 2/1944-4-1006 IV.
34  Szamos, April 11, 1944, 3.
35  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 16.
36  Already 48 shops in Avasújváros were closed on 14 April. Direcţia Judeţeană Satu Mare a Arhivelor 
Naţionale (DJSM) [Local branch of  the Romanian National Archives in Satu Mare], Prefectura Judeţului 
Satu Mare (PJSM) [Prefecture of  Satu Mare County] 1944/111, 46.
37  Szamos, April 17, 1944, 2.
38  Ibid., April 21, 1944, 6.
39  DJSM PJSM 1944/111, 43.
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A special conference was held in Szatmárnémeti on April 26 in order to 
discuss the organization of  the ghetto. During this conference, László Endre, 
the state secretary in the Ministry of  the Interior, explained that he expected 
“full and honest collaboration from all civil servants and others participating in 
this action, which, possibly, may not be fully appreciated until history has proven 
us right.”40 Endre seemed convinced that de-Jewifi cation would bring salvation 
to the Hungarians.
All top-ranking offi cials were present at the conference, including the mayor 
of  Szatmárnémeti, who was responsible for executing orders in the city. While 
precious little is known about what actually happened during the conference, 
it is likely that future Jewish policy was discussed.41 After the conference, the 
majority of  the Hungarian leaders decided to remain in their positions. This 
failure of  Hungarian offi cials and leaders to resign from their posts is persuasive 
evidence that they supported a more radical “solution of  the Jewish question.”
One exception was the prefect of  Szatmár County, Ferenc Kölcsey, who 
resigned and was replaced by Barnabás Endrődi on April 25.42 According to Béla 
Földvári, a Jewish survivor, Kölcsey had received information about the plans 
for deportation and had told Földvári’s family about them. Kölcsey informed 
them: “fi rst they [the Germans] will take you [the Jews] and then they will take 
us [the Hungarians].”43 The fact that Kölcsey resigned (and this made him an 
exception) indicates that he understood that something radical was going to be 
implemented, and that he was not willing to take responsibility for it.44 
The commission for the apprehension of  Jews in Szatmárnémeti and its 
surroundings held a special meeting after the conference. The mayor chaired 
the meeting and representatives from the police, the gendarmerie, the fi nancial 
and tax departments of  the city and primary and secondary school teachers 
attended it.45 They decided that the location of  the Szatmárnémeti ghetto should 
be established in the Jewish neighborhood in the centre of  the city.46 On April 
27, the local newspaper reported that “an important decree is under negotiation 
40  Eugene Levai, Black Book on the Martyrdom of  Hungarian Jewry (Zurich: Central European Times, 1948), 
126.
41  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 77–78.
42  Szamos, April 28, 1944, 1.
43  USC SFI, testimony 50370 tape 3.
44  Another possibility is that politics played a role in which the new regime aimed at fi lling the top 
positions with new leaders and that Kölcsey was forced to resign.
45  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 31, 101.
46  Ibid., 21.
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by the government regarding Jewish houses and a designated area for Jews,” i.e. 
the ghetto.47 By this time, the deportation of  Jews was already underway in the 
neighboring district of  Carpatho-Ruthenia.
The newspaper explained that a governmental decree made it possible for 
the authorities to requisition Jewish houses. The justifi cation for this was simply 
the contention that “Jews live in better houses than non-Jews.”48 The offi cial 
reason was that the homes of  Jewish families were needed by members of  
Hungarian society, emphasizing the material side of  Hungarian “needs.” The 
purpose of  the decree was to persuade segments of  the Hungarian public that 
they would soon receive Jewish houses, and thus create public support for the 
expropriations. This justifi cation was also part of  an attempt to legitimize the 
concentration of  Jews in the ghetto with the claim that they generally lived in 
better conditions than Hungarians. 
Furthermore, ghettoization was also intended to prevent Jewish resistance. 
Security concerns (however deluded) motivated the announcement on April 28 
that “Jews are not allowed to buy explosives and all their licenses to use weapons 
will be withdrawn.”49 This decree served the purpose of  constructing Jews as 
an “inner enemy,” even though the local police were fully aware of  the lack of  
violent organized resistance among Jews.
On April 17, 1944, the authorities ordered all Jews to declare their property, 
including property supervised by non-Jews.50 However, few Jews had reported 
their property by the end of  April, and on April 28 the order was repeated.51 The 
fi nance offi ce announced that it would be open even on Sundays from eight in 
the morning until six in the afternoon in order to receive the declarations.52 
At this point, the intention of  the declaration was to create the public 
impression that everything was in order. However, privately the authorities feared 
that Jews would leave with their capital or transfer money abroad. The mayor 
therefore decided to forbid Jews from leaving the city.53 Additionally, the mayor 
issued a decree the same day prohibiting Jews from using the telephone, sending 
telegrams, or transferring money at the post offi ce. However, the director of  the 
47  Szamos, April 27, 1944, 1.
48  Ibid., April 28, 1944, 2.
49  Ibid., 3.
50  Ibid., April 17, 1944, 2.
51  Ibid., April 28, 1944, 2.
52  Ibid., April 29, 1944, 2.
53  Ibid., 2.
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post offi ce rejected the order and resigned.54 He was one of  the few known cases 
of  someone in a leading position who protested against the orders given by the 
mayor during the ghettoization.
On April 28, the “ghetto order” was made. The offi cial name of  the decree 
was “Concerning the regulation of  certain questions relating to the determination 
of  the Jews.” It stipulated the establishment of  “a designated area” and was 
announced in the local newspaper on May 1.55 Furthermore, it stipulated that 
“Christians” living in the area had to move out.56 On May 3, all Jews wearing 
the yellow star were ordered to remain inside their homes. As of  May 4, all Jews 
who were not living in the ghetto were only allowed to go outside between 9:00 
o’clock and 11:00 o’clock in the morning.57 
Jews were rounded up and brought to the ghetto between May 3 and 6; 
Jews from surrounding villages and cities were brought to the ghetto later.58 The 
ghettoization proceeded without any major disturbances. The reasons for this 
were that there was no resistance movement organized by the Jews and no major 
opposition by the Hungarian public or Hungarian offi cials.59 
The rounding up of  Jews was carried out by special units composed of  civil 
servants, including local primary and secondary school teachers, gendarmes and 
policemen, who were under the authority of  the mayor and operated under his 
jurisdiction. Thus a large share of  the public sector was involved in this process. 
Jews were brought to the ghetto and were only allowed to bring a limited amount 
of  personal belongings and food. 
Another special unit came afterwards to make an inventory and ascertain 
whether the Jews had declared all of  their property. The Jews received a copy 
of  the declaration as a sign that the whole process was legal. This created the 
false impression that they would be given back their property once they returned 
from the ghetto.60 
The local newspaper reported that “a new episode in the economic life of  
the city” had begun. Decrees had been announced on April 16 and the Jews 
had to “declare” their property upon it. After the establishment of  the ghetto 
54  Hegyi and Lőwy, “Szatmárnémeti,” 1044–45.
55  Decree ME 1610/1944 qtd in Szamos May 1, 1944, 1; Háráv Náftáli Stern, ed., Emlékezz Szatmárra: a 
szatmári zsidóság emlékkönyve (Bene-Berak: n.p., 1984), 39. 
56  Szamos, May 1, 1944, 1.
57  Hegyi and Lőwy, “Szatmárnémeti,” 1045.
58  Csaba Csirák, ed., Szatmári zsidó emlékek (Szatmárnémeti: n.p., 2001), 140. 
59  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 24, 31–32.
60  Ibid., 31.
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in the beginning of  May, this property was “seized,” i.e. it became the national 
property of  the Hungarian state.61 However, according to one newspaper article, 
the amount that was seized was “surprisingly little.” The same article stated 
that “economic experts believe that one of  the reasons for this is that Jews are 
keeping money for themselves.”62 Jewish testimonies confi rm that they were 
indeed hiding some of  their valuables or had given them to Christians whom 
they trusted.63 Thus, Jews realized that the “declaration” was only a pretext for 
the theft of  their property. 
Another explanation for the perception that the property that had been 
seized from the Jews was “little” was that Hungarian offi cials took advantage of  
the opportunity to steal items for themselves. Sources confi rm that Hungarian 
offi cials seized the opportunity and took things that were easy to carry.64 The 
newspaper also cited cases of  illegal transactions. In one case two detectives 
had accepted a bribe from a Jew and were sentenced to prison. This reveals that 
offi cials used the opportunity for private economic gain.65 In some cases Jewish 
houses were looted before the authorities arrived to take inventory.66 However, 
according to a police report, already by the end of  1943 and beginning of  1944 
some of  the more affl uent Jews had transferred some of  their wealth abroad.67 
According to eyewitness Livia Kellerman, some Hungarians suggested 
to their Jewish neighbors that they trust them with their valuables instead of  
handing them over to the authorities.68 Another Jewish survivor, Margerete 
Weinberger, claimed that “Gentiles were waiting to take over,” i.e. that as soon 
as the Jews had been rounded up, Hungarians used the opportunity to steal.69 
This reinforced the economic incentives of  Hungarians to de-Jewify the city.
Another explanation for the perception of  the allegedly “low” quantity of  the 
Jewish property that had been expropriated could simply be that the expectations 
concerning the amount of  property owned by Jews were exaggerated. The anti-
Jewish legislation had been in force for almost four years, and moreover the war 
61  Szamos, May 6, 1944, 3.
62  Ibid. 
63  USC SFI, testimonies 8102, 29247, 41683.
64  Csirák, Szatmári zsidó emlékek, 143.
65  Szamos, May 12, 1944, 3.
66  USC SFI, testimony 14701.
67  Police Report, Jan 1944, MNL OL PT1 651/2 73 doboz 1941-7-6000, 651.f. 2/1944-4-1006.
68  USC SFI, testimony 21264.
69  USC SFI, testimony 25815.
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had created economic diffi culties for everyone, but especially for the Jews.70 This 
contributed to the false perception among the Hungarian authorities and public 
that the Jews were much richer than they actually were. This perception was also 
fed by the existence of  a few wealthy Jews.
Around 200 of  them, most of  them wealthy, were interrogated. Some of  
them were tortured because they did not cooperate or voluntarily hand over 
their valuables, according to Jewish sources.71 Some Jews committed suicide 
because of  the torture, including a noted Jewish grain merchant.72 According to 
the eye-witness Magda Moldovan, another wealthy Jew was shot on the spot by 
SS men.73 According to the Jewish memorial book of  Szatmár, 30 people were 
killed in the ghetto and 9 people committed suicide, some of  them after having 
been tortured, others because they could not bear the conditions in the ghetto.74 
Thus, one of  the main purposes of  the ghetto was indeed to rob the Jews of  
their remaining property and valuables.
On May 12, the mayor announced that all Jewish property seized had 
become national property.75 This means that economic re-Hungarianization 
had been completed before the deportations began. However, the process of  
redistribution had not yet begun. The purpose seems to have been to raise the 
expectations among the Hungarian public in order to legitimize the rounding 
up of  Jews. From a Jewish perspective, this was only the beginning of  a series 
of  horrors that only a few of  them could have anticipated. Many of  them still 
believed that, as Hungarian citizens, they would be exempted from deportations.
The fast reduction of  the Jewish workforce created major disturbances 
in economic and industrial production. For example, efforts were made in 
several places to make exceptions for Jewish doctors because of  the shortage 
of  physicians. This shortage was made severe, since 45 percent of  doctors fell 
under the anti-Jewish legislation. The result was a signifi cant health care problem 
in Hungary.76 
70  Ronald W. Zweig, The Gold Train: The Destruction of  the Jews and the Looting of  Hungary (New York: 
Morrow, 2002), 218.
71  USC SFI, testimony 50370 tape 3; 13361; Náftáli Stern, ed., Emlékezz Szatmárra, 13; Braham, Genocide 
and Retribution, 104. 
72  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 104.
73  USC SFI, testimony 14701.
74  Náftáli Stern, ed., Emlékezz Szatmárra, 14.
75  Decree no. 12.880/1944 12 May 1944.
76  Kádár and Vági, “‘Solving the Jewish Question’ versus the ‘Interests of  the Production’,” 527–29.
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Still, the concentration of  Jews in the ghetto made it possible to re-
Hungarianize the economy. Hungarian leaders used both alleged security 
concerns and economic incentives to establish the ghetto, but they were 
primarily interested in seizing Jewish property. In this way, the Final Solution was 
promoted by the Hungarian elite and received support (or at least was not met 
with opposition) from the larger part of  the Hungarian public. The expectation 
among the Hungarian public was that they would receive Jewish houses, properties 
and companies. The de-Jewifi cation of  the city was presented as the salvation of  
the Hungarians, but the process in fact involved the loss of  signifi cant human 
expertise and experience. The economy was practically brought to a standstill, 
as a substantial part of  it was in the process of  being re-Hungarianized. More 
than half  of  all shops were closed, and industrial companies lost more than 40 
percent of  their skilled managers and workers. This caused major disturbances 
in the production and supply of  goods, which had negative consequences for 
society at large.77  
Deportations
The Jews were rounded up at the beginning of  May, and most Jews lived in the 
ghetto for roughly 3 weeks before being deported. There were two ghettos in 
Szatmár County, one in Szatmárnémeti and the other in Nagybánya. Jews were 
brought from the surrounding smaller cities, villages and districts into the two 
cities.78 At its peak at the end of  May, the Szatmárnémeti ghetto had around 
19,000 Jews.79
The Jews from the Szatmárnémeti ghetto were deported in six transports. 
The fi rst train departed on May 19 and the last on June 1, with around 3,000 Jews 
in every transport. The expenses for the deportations had to be paid by the city, 
but were reimbursed by the state.80 This means that Hungary paid for the cost 
of  deportations to Nazi Germany using seized Jewish property, an arrangement 
that has been referred to as “self-fi nancing genocide.”81 
Jewish survivors offer different assessments of  how the Hungarian public 
reacted when the Jews were taken to the railway station. One Jewish eye-witness 
77  Ibid., 520–21.
78  Csirák, ed., Szatmári zsidó emlékek, 139.
79  Braham, Genocide and Retribution, 31.
80  Order issued 13 May 1944, DJSM PJSM 1944/56, 24–25.
81  Kádár and Vági, Self-Financing Genocide.
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claimed that “people were crying,”82 while two others stated that people were 
“smiling” and “clapping their hands.” Yet another claimed that “the rest of  
the population did not say anything when we were deported.”83 Regarding 
responsibility for the deportations, one Jewish survivor claimed that “our 
neighbors, the Hungarians, were participating, not the Germans.”84 Another 
summarized the collaboration between the Hungarians and the Germans by 
saying that “the Hungarians were more interested in valuables and Germans 
in our lives.”85 Local Jewish testimonies therefore support the notion that the 
Holocaust in Hungary was the result of  a combination of  Hungarian material 
interests and the Nazi German desire to exterminate the Jews.
The fi nal destination of  the transports from Szatmárnémeti was Auschwitz-
Birkenau, where a majority of  the Jews would either be immediately killed or 
perish because of  the harsh conditions of  camp life. The fast deportation of  the 
Hungarian Jews to the extermination and concentration camps (4 trains every 
24 hours) resulted in a high death rate among them. It is estimated that around 
65–75 percent of  the Jews who were deported from Northern Transylvania 
died.86 Thus around 12,000–14,000 Jews from the Szatmárnémeti ghetto died as 
a result of  the harsh conditions in the ghetto and trains or else were murdered 
in Auschwitz-Birkenau.
Although the Hungarian authorities seized property from the deported Jews, 
the local newspaper claimed that many valuables were still missing. “Christians” 
who had received property from Jews were “robbing the Hungarian state,” 
according to the newspaper. The editor, Albert Figus, urged everyone to report 
all Jewish property to the authorities.87 The Hungarian authorities suspected that 
neighbors had taken Jewish property and requested that everyone hand all such 
property over to the authorities.
While Jews were suffering or being killed in Auschwitz-Birkenau, the local 
newspaper claimed that “Hungarian history justifi ed the solution of  the Jewish 
question, because former periods had shown the danger of  letting Jews take 
82  USC SFI, testimony 50370 tape 3.
83  USC SFI, testimonies 754, 18970; DEGOB protocol 133.
84  USC SFI, testimony 2281.
85  USC SFI, testimony 6837.
86  Zoltán Tibori Szabó, “The Fate of  the Transylvanian Jews in the Period Following World War II, 
1945–948” in J. Molnár, ed., The Holocaust in Hungary (Budapest; Balassi, 2005), 360–81 (362). Tamás 
Stark, “A magyar zsidóság a vészkorszakban és a második világháború után: Statisztikai áttekintés,” Regio – 
Kisebbség, politika, társadalom 3 (1993): 140–50 (149).
87  Szamos, May 22, 1944, 3.
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over.”88 This referred to the alleged overrepresentation of  Jews in the economy 
from the Dualist period until April 1944.
Hungarians had a signifi cant incentive to seize Jewish property, which they 
defi ned as Hungarian property, while Nazi Germany was mainly interested 
in exterminating the Jews. The result was that the deportations of  Jews from 
Szatmár was among the fastest and most destructive chapters of  the Holocaust 
in Europe, as never had so many Jews been deported and so much property 
seized in such a short time.89 The rapid deportations were implemented chiefl y 
by Hungarian authorities in cooperation with Nazi German experts in genocide. 
Still, a few members of  the Jewish elite managed to escape the horror by paying 
large bribes.
“National Gift”
The seizure of  Jewish property, according to the plans of  the state, was the fi rst 
step in a major social welfare program to the benefi t of  the Hungarian public. 
Jewish property was stored and protected by the municipal administration. On 
May 21, the seized property of  Jews in the surrounding cities was transferred 
to Szatmárnémeti.90 The most valuable things were taken to Budapest by train.91 
All former Jewish houses not intended for immediate public use were sealed.92 
On May 9, the new prefect announced in the local newspaper that the seized 
Jewish property would be redistributed as a form of  social welfare. He promised 
to give textiles, clothes, and shoes to poor workers and their families. There was 
also the possibility that Jewish homes would be reallocated, but before doing 
this he would have to wait for further instructions. The prefect claimed that this 
new system was something that people in general had been expecting for a long 
time.93 Thus, he aimed to arouse high expectations among the Hungarian public.
On May 12, clothing that had been stolen from Jews was sold at low 
(symbolic) prices to poor workers with children in order to facilitate a “rapid 
solution to the social problem,” said the mayor.94 According to the local paper, 
Jewish property that had been seized created an opportunity to provide support 
88  Ibid., May 23, 1944, 7.
89  Kádár and Vági, Self-Financing Genocide, xxi-iv.
90  DJSM PJSM 1944/56, 24-5.
91  Ibid., 29.
92  Ibid., 33.
93  Szamos, 9 May 1944, 3.
94  Ibid., May 11, 1944, 3.
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for the city’s “largest family,” benefi ciaries of  the public welfare offi ce, which 
included 3,599 families with 11,612 individuals. Thus, about 25–30 percent of  
all inhabitants of  the city were entitled to social welfare, which indeed gave the 
Hungarian public a material interest in seizing “Jewish property.” 
The ghettoization of  Jews enabled the Hungarian authorities to provide 
more support for non-Jewish families. According to reports, 200 cows and fi fty 
horses were seized and redistributed. Horses were given to families of  soldiers. 
Wagons and tools were distributed to Hungarians in the same way.95 Agricultural 
machines seized from Jews were distributed among farmers.96 
The conclusion is that Jewish property was used as “national gift,” i.e. as 
part of  a program for social welfare. In the end, it was not entirely a “gift,” as 
poor Hungarians had to pay a symbolic price in order to obtain clothing that had 
been stolen from Jews. This justifi ed the robbing and deportation of  Jews and 
gave the Final Solution a political legitimacy among the Hungarian public under 
the pretext that national property was actually being restored. 
Requesting “National Property”
On May 16, 1944, the Hungarian authorities ordered that all valuables be 
collected, stored and listed in protocols.97 As a group, civil servants had some of  
the highest expectations and demanded material compensation for their work. 
On May 16, twenty civil servants submitted a signed request to the prefect in 
which they claimed that, “we have read in the newspaper Szamos that Jewish 
property will be redistributed to poor people and workers.”98 However, the 
civil servants who signed the petition regarded this as an offence, as the “work 
conducted by the civil servants had not been fully compensated.”99
At this point, they had not yet received houses or fl ats, so the civil servants 
requested that they be given the clothes that Jews had left behind “in the name 
of  the middle class, which is facing more expensive times.” The civil servants 
argued that “the fi ne clothes owned by the Jews were not suitable for physical 
work.” They meant to imply that the clothing should be given to them, white-
collar workers, not to blue-collar workers. Furthermore, they stressed that they 
95  Ibid., May 11, 1944, 3.
96  DJSM PJSM 1944/11 8, 96–110. 
97  MNL OL 150 IV. k.fő 30 tétel Szatmárnémeti, 768.
98  PJSM Comisar guvernamentar al aprov. publica 1944/22-2, 31-2.
99  Ibid.
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did “not ask for luxurious things.”100 On May 24, a second group of  civil 
servants requested that they should receive clothes, household utensils and 
furniture left by the Jews because of  the “diffi cult economic situation and the 
low salaries.”101
However, strict orders were given on May 25 according to which no 
“redistribution was allowed except for social welfare.”102 All belongings were to be 
kept until a full inventory had been conducted, and only then would redistribution 
begin. Still, the pressure from the general population and the widespread 
expectation that people would receive properties that had been stolen from the 
Jews were high, and many private individuals and institutions continued to send 
requests for their “share” of  the “national property.”103 Pressure from the civil 
servants increased, as on May 26 they were joined by other professionals to make 
their case stronger. In another letter, 33 civil servants, teachers and policemen 
(groups that had participated in the rounding up of  Jews and the establishment 
and administration of  the ghetto) requested “Jewish clothes,” as they regarded 
themselves as “low paid workers who could not afford these kinds of  clothes.” 
The tone of  the letter was more demanding than that of  the previous request. 
The petitioners claimed that “the issue is urgent and important,” because for 
two weeks they had “worked from 5:00 o’clock in the morning until 7:00-8:00 
o’clock in the evening, performing not only administrative work but also hard 
physical labor.” According to their request, if  they were not given new clothes, 
“they [would] not have proper clothes to work in.”104
Thus, civil servants expected to receive economic compensation for their 
help in deporting the Jews. However, the prefect denied their request for clothing 
and textiles.105 The formal reason for the denial was that all property had to be 
inventoried and listed and that the government had to issue an order before the 
redistribution could begin.106 In order to indicate his appreciation for the role 
played by the civil servants, the mayor announced at the end of  May that “all 
100  Ibid.
101  PJSM Comisar guvernamentar al aprov. publica 1944/22-2, 25.
102  DJSM PJSM 1944/56, 36.
103  Ibid., 1944/56, 91–158.
104  PJSM Comisar guvernamentar al aprov. publica 1944/22-2, 27.
105  In another case the teachers of  the city of  Nagybánya who had undertaken the inventory of  the 
property that the Jews had left behind requested, “as the nation’s humble servants”, to be compensated with 
“textiles, linen, shoes or perhaps furniture.” PJSM Comisar guvernamentar al aprov. publica 1944/22-2, 1.
106  Ibid., 1944/22-2, 2, 82.
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civil servants are serving on the inner front,” i.e. they were serving as soldiers in 
the local war against the internal enemies.107 
Other groups that made requests for the confi scated Jewish property 
included pensioners, disabled veterans, refugees from southern Transylvania, 
priests, 130 railway workers, and journalists.108 All of  these groups claimed 
that they had undertaken important tasks related to de-Jewifying and re-
Hungarianizing the city. Public institutions such as the civil defense association, 
military hospital, workers’ offi ce, and the local branch of  the Red Cross all 
asked to receive equipment and material from Jewish institutions or private 
persons.109  
Some of  the textiles had been sold to poor families through the social 
welfare offi ce, but in June it was reported that the remaining textiles needed 
to be cleaned and thus no further distribution was authorized.110 It was clear 
at this point that “the general principle is that Jewish property should not be 
given for social purposes.”111 This was a total change in policy in comparison 
with the actions and promises made in May. The reason was that “all property 
that remained belonged to the Jewish owners until a new law regarding this 
would be passed.”112 The issue of  Jewish property had not been solved at the 
legal level, and so the whole process of  redistribution was delayed, causing 
disappointment among those who expected economic compensation for their 
work and support.
To conclude, Hungarians working for the Hungarian authorities and at 
other national institutions expected to be compensated for their support and 
the work they had performed in connection with the deportation of  the Jews. 
They claimed to be the rightful benefi ciaries of  Jewish property. This shows how 
a mechanism of  exploitation operated in which the enrichment of  Christian 
Hungarians at the expense of  Jews was justifi ed by alleged national merits.
107  Szamos, May 31, 1944, 3.
108  PJSM Comisar guvernamentar al aprov. publica 1944/22-2, 5, 44, 64, 87, 111, 113, 115, 125–26, 129, 
198–99, 210.
109  Ibid., 1944/22-2, 4, 18, 34–35, 67, 83, 105–08.
110  MNL OL 150 IV. k. fő 30 tétel Szatmárnémeti, 778; Jews had been hiding textiles that were found, 
Szamos, June 13, 1944, 3.
111  MNL OL 150 IV. k. fő 30 tétel Szatmárnémeti, 778–79.
112  Ibid.
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Houses and Flats
Jews owned a signifi cant share of  the houses in the city. On May 10, the local 
newspaper reported that “the solution of  the Jewish question solved the problem 
of  housing in a radical way.”113 On May 9, people in the city had already begun 
to submit requests to receive Jewish houses and fl ats. It was decided that public 
institutions should be given priority in this redistribution. The second priority 
was “civil servants who did not have any place of  their own”, because there were 
several cases in which the families of  civil servants rented their dwellings.114 The 
third category was civil servants who had fl ats that were deemed too small. 
This announcement clearly shows how civil servants were promised 
compensation in the form of  Jewish homes for their assistance in the process of  
rounding Jews up. It is likely that many civil servants expected to receive benefi ts 
for their work and that this was their primary motivation in helping in (instead 
of  protesting against) the ghettoization and deportation of  the city’s Jews.
In the course of  the following days, the prefect changed the priority 
regarding the redistribution of  houses and emphasized social welfare, meaning 
that poor families with many children or without houses would be fi rst to receive 
lodgings that had been stolen from Jews.115 Social welfare institutions such as 
kindergartens and retirement homes were also given priority.116 
The estimated number of  Jewish houses in mid-May was around 1,200 out 
of  6,000 dwellings. Still, this was only an estimate, as Jews from other places 
owned houses in the city and the fi nal report had not yet been completed. The 
fi nal outcome of  the redistribution was of  “great public interest” according to 
the local newspaper, since Jews had possessed a large share of  what was referred 
to as “national property.”117
The expectations rose among Hungarians that they would benefi t materially 
from the redistribution of  Jewish homes. The newspaper reported that 
“everyone wants to move to Szatmár[németi],” and by the end of  May as many 
as 2,099 requests to move to the city had indeed arrived. It was announced in the 
newspaper that “Christian [Hungarian] working families with many children” 
113  Szamos, May 10, 1944, 3.
114  Ibid.
115  Ibid., May 11, 1944, 2.
116  Ibid., May 12, 1944, 7.
117  Ibid., May 16, 1944, 3.
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would be the fi rst to be given homes. People who requested houses because they 
wanted more comfortable and larger accommodations would be denied.118 
The inventory of  the houses was undertaken by a special fi nance committee 
consisting of  twelve members. They made a list of  all items of  furniture and 
appointed a caretaker, who either rented the house to a Hungarian renter or 
sealed it. The rent was paid to a public account. According to the report, because 
of  the shortage of  policemen, some Jewish houses had been entered before the 
special commission came.119 However, in my view it is not unlikely that offi cials 
also abused their mandate in the interest of  their own economic gain. This was 
the case in other places in Northern Transylvania.120 
The redistribution of  houses started in mid-June when the fi rst families 
with several children moved in, and another fi fty families were about to follow.121 
According to the newspaper, Jews had occupied the best houses in the city, while 
several thousand Hungarians had been living in poor conditions. By this time, 
3,100 requests had been received. “A new happy Hungarian life has started,” 
reported the newspaper on June 23.122 Rose Markovits claimed that “a Hungarian 
peasant family took over our house and they loved it,” because “for the fi rst time 
they had a decent home and they had gotten something that they had never had 
before.”123 
By the beginning of  July, 360 Hungarian workers had received one-room 
and two-room houses and fl ats, while another 4,000 requests were pending.124 
The constant increase in requests reveals how large a share of  the public had 
an interest in obtaining Jewish property. By the end of  July, all “Jewish” real 
estate and fl ats had a caretaker appointed and were seized as Hungarian state 
property.125 
The newspaper reported that “the building of  the new Szatmár[németi] will 
go smoothly when real estate is in the hands of  the state.”126 Flats and houses 
were rented out and the newspaper announced that “everyone will have a place 
118  Ibid., May 22, 1944, 4.
119  MNL OL 150 IV. k. fő 30 tétel Szatmárnémeti, 778–80.
120  MNL OL K523 BM Államvédelmi Központ általános i-1944-2-78, q.f. Karsai, László, “The Last 
Chapter of  the Holocaust”, Yad Vashem Studies, 34 (2004), 293–329 (321).
121  Szamos, June 14, 1944, 3.
122  Ibid., June 22, 1944, 2; 23 June, 3.
123  USC SFI, testimonies 13361.
124  Szamos, July 7, 1944, 3.
125  Ibid., July 26, 1944, 5; 31 July, 3.
126  Ibid., July 31, 1944, 3.
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to live.” This work was undertaken by 40 teachers, who compiled a registry of  all 
of  the houses.127 Schools were waiting to take over the buildings that had been 
used by Jewish schools and, according to the newspaper, the “whole nation is 
waiting to get its property back.”128 
In mid-August, it was announced that 3,260 families would receive houses 
or fl ats and that 1,800 had already moved in. These dwellings were given fi rst 
to poor people and civil servants and then were distributed to the rest of  the 
public.129 In the end, civil servants were compensated for the assistance they had 
provided in rounding up Jews and seizing their property. Also a large segment 
of  society benefi tted materially from the transfer, as around 40 percent of  all 
houses and fl ats in the city were redistributed.
In conclusion, the deportation of  Jews enabled a major redistribution of  
houses and fl ats to a large share of  the Christian Hungarian public in general 
and the Hungarian elite in particular, as they received credit and compensation 
for this major transformation. Houses and fl ats were distributed as a form of  
social welfare, but were also given as compensation to civil servants who had 
participated in the deportation of  Jews. The position of  civil servants allowed 
them opportunities to gain economic advantages, both legally and illegally. 
This shows how a mechanism of  ethno-racial exploitation functioned. The 
large redistribution of  Jewish property to the Hungarian public was a way of  
legitimizing the deportations and currying popular support. 
Redistribution Delayed
In June, the principles for the redistribution and re-Hungarianizing of  Jewish 
property were circulated, with the general criterion being to give priority to public 
projects.130 According to the local newspaper, former Jewish property became 
“national property and a national gift,” as the property was being restored to its 
“rightful owners.”131 However, the process of  redistribution was delayed and 
all Jewish valuables were stored in Hotel Pannonia (formerly Hotel Dacia) and 
in warehouses. According to the local newspaper, the Hungarian authorities 
127  Ibid., Aug. 3, 1944, 2.
128  Ibid., Aug. 5, 1944, 3.
129  Ibid., Aug. 12, 1944, 3
130  DJSM PJSM 1944/56, 159.
131  Szamos, July 6, 1944, 1.
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accumulated one wagonload of  gold in total as well as “luxury products of  the 
fi nest quality.”132
 The Hungarian Government was delayed in the redistribution of  Jewish 
property, and it was only in June, two months after the expropriations had begun, 
that a Commissioner for Jewish property was appointed.133 Decrees regarding 
Jewish property had been contradictory; at fi rst, the Hungarian government had 
decreed that clothing would be sold as part of  a social welfare program, but later 
this and other decrees were suspended.
On August 10, the criterion for redistribution was fi nally announced. Jewish 
property was to be used for the “public and national good.” This included 
redistribution to, fi rst and foremost, military organizations (such as the Levente 
Associations, which were paramilitary youth organizations), social and religious 
institutions, cultural houses, churches and educational institutions, all of  which, 
of  course, were regarded (and legally defi ned) as Christian Hungarian.134 With 
regards to the redistribution of  property to private individuals, the following 
priorities were established:
1. Surviving members of  soldiers’ families; 
2. World War I veterans;
3. Poor families with several children;
4. Disabled or impoverished people without property;
5. Partisan fi ghters (fi ghting for Hungary in non-regular units);
6. Workers earning less than 200 pengő per month;
7. Families who had lost property because of  bombing;
8. Pregnant women;
9. Civil servants with eight or more children.135
This list of  priorities clearly refl ects considerations of  social welfare. It also 
recognized and privileged groups that were fi ghting for the “nation,” i.e. soldiers 
and their families, as well as civil servants.
132  Ibid., July 13, 1944, 3.
133  Zweig, The Gold Train, 219.
134  In Nagybánya confi scated Jewish houses were used as kindergartens, hospitals, the Levente 
Association, the police, the Reformed Church’s school, teachers’ and clerks’ residences, DJSM PJSM 
1944/133, 40. The situation was similar in Csenger, Nagysomkút, Avasújváros and Kápolnamonostor. See 
ibid., 10, 71, 73, 85. 
135  DJSM PJSM 1944/56, 201–04.
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Even though the criteria for redistribution had been decided, the newspaper 
announced on August 12 that the huge task of  completing the inventory had 
not been fi nished.136 The city was bombed on August 16 and 17 and again on 
September 19 and 20, and many people left for the countryside. Shops and 
warehouses were not guarded and there was some looting, according to a police 
report.137 Ultimately, only a fraction of  the property was redistributed. Following 
the chaos created by the advancing front and the bombing of  the city, confi scated 
Jewish property remained in warehouses or was stolen.138 
In conclusion, a signifi cant amount of  the property that had been expropriated 
from Jews was never redistributed because the process was delayed, and during 
this time a great deal of  property was stolen or lost. The redistribution was 
intended to provide social welfare and to reward “national merits.” The delay of  
redistribution meant that the Hungarian people’s expectation that they would be 
given some part of  this “national gift” was frustrated.
Conclusions
The main method of  re-Hungarianizing the economy in the city of  Szatmárnémeti 
was the ghettoization and deportation of  Jews. This created an opportunity 
to seize, confi scate, rob, steal and redistribute Jewish assets. However, in the 
process of  property seizure and collective thieving, a signifi cant share of  the 
values that were in principle to be stolen by the state was simply appropriated by 
individuals and never nationalized. Hungarian politicians, policemen, gendarmes, 
civil servants and others took part in this collective and private looting, which 
became a vast operation and occupied major segments of  the population for 
several months during the summer of  1944.
Jewish property was re-Hungarianized in a process consisting of  several 
stages. First, Jews had to declare their property. Second, the Hungarian 
government and individual Hungarian citizens seized property when the Jews 
were rounded up. The last and somewhat delayed part of  the process was when 
the Hungarian government redistributed lodgings and real estate by appointing 
Hungarian caretakers, renting out dwellings, or simply giving property away. 
136  Szamos, Aug. 12, 1944, 3.
137  MNL OL PT1 651/2 73 doboz 1941-7-6000 651.f. 2/1944-4-1006, 86.
138  According to Zweig, “It is not clear what percentage of  the movable assets owned by Jews was 
actually handed over to the central government, and what remained ‘unoffi cially’ in the hands of  the local 
police and Financial Directorate offi cials.” Zweig, The Gold Train, 219. 
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The political aim of  de-Jewifying the city, which was to ensure popular support, 
was accomplished; however, while the properties and belongings had been 
re-Hungarianized on a formal level through seizure, this did not mean that 
all “Jewish” jobs, including positions in workshops and manufactories, were 
taken by Hungarians. The deportation of  Jews and the redistribution of  Jewish 
property caused signifi cant disruptions in the economy.
Some of  the properties that were seized were used as a form of  social 
welfare. This social welfare functioned as a way of  pacifying the Hungarian public 
and generating political support for the regime. Moreover, it helped legitimize 
the deportations. The seizure of  Jewish property created an expectation among 
Hungarians that their economic situation would improve, because it was generally 
believed that Jews were wealthy. However, in the end, some of  the property 
was never redistributed within the frameworks of  the social welfare programs 
because of  administrative and legal issues, and also because Hungarian rule in 
northern Transylvania came to an end when the Romanian army entered the city 
in late October 1944. One important exception was the redistribution of  houses 
and fl ats, which were given to Hungarians. This did indeed constitute a huge 
economic transformation. 
Certain sectors of  economic life were severely disrupted by the loss 
of  human capital and know-how, which created a general standstill of  the 
economy. The Holocaust not only destroyed the Jewish community of  the city, 
murdering its members, it also destroyed a signifi cant part of  the city’s economy. 
Before the German occupation, the Hungarian authorities had been cautious 
and implemented a gradual re-Hungarianization, but radical forces among the 
Hungarian elite and the new pro-German regime abandoned this approach. 
They seemed convinced that the operation would be economically benefi cial to 
the Hungarian community. In reality, they paid a high price for having cleansed 
the city of  Jews. 
Hungarian leaders were convinced that a complete seizure of  minority 
property would improve their own situation and that the gradual implementation 
of  this policy (instead of  a rapid implementation) had been the reason for the 
policy’s previous failure. In 1944, they therefore supported a radical policy 
of  enacting a large-scale operation as quickly as possible that was meant to 
prove them right. Eventually, this turned out to be an illusion, as it created 
major economic disturbances and a political economy of  exploitation. The 
fact that a similar process in Romania, which never involved deportation on 
the same scale that took place in Hungary, has similar negative economic 
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consequences suggests that indeed the relationship between the two (ethno-
racial nationalizing and economic stagnation) was causal.139 These two cases 
of  Hungarianization and Romanianization clearly exemplify the economic 
problems (beyond the obvious human ones) involved in ethnic and racial 
discrimination and exploitation. 
In the interwar period, the Romanian elite in Szatmárnémeti believed that 
it was possible to Romanianize all sectors of  the economy, even though the 
Romanians were themselves a minority in the city. The Hungarian elite believed 
in much the same way that they could re-Hungarianize all sectors of  society 
when the city again fell under Hungarian rule in 1940. In both cases, however, the 
minorities succeeded in maintaining their presence in or control over important 
parts of  the economy. Ironically, this was partly the result of  the successful 
nationalizing in the public sector, which increased economic space for minorities 
in the private sphere one. Another reason was that minorities found ways to 
circumvent the legal efforts to nationalize the economy, which they were able to 
undermine through bribes and political pressure.
The Hungarian elite in particular promoted the elimination of  Jews as 
part of  the “Final Solution” with the support of  Hungarian society in order to 
achieve a complete re-Hungarianization of  the economy. In my view, support 
for this policy can be partly explained by the stepwise process by which it was 
implemented. When one measure did not produce the desired effect, this only 
heightened expectations and increased pressure to devise more radical measures 
with which to improve the economic situation in the context of  the war. In 
the case of  Szatmárnémeti, wealthy Jews remained in their positions, and some 
were exempt from legal measures, despite the anti-Jewish legislation. This delay 
in implementing the most vicious measures reinforced the public demand and 
support for a more radical solution. This argument and mechanism echoes the 
ideas put forward by Raul Hilberg, who claims that the decision to annihilate 
the Jews required “the implementation of  systematic administrative measures in 
successive steps.”140 Hilberg claims that fi rst Jews were racially defi ned; second, 
expropriation operations were initiated; third, Jews were concentrated in ghettos; 
and fi nally, the decision was made to annihilate them.
The discrimination against Jews and the promotion of  Hungarians in the 
economic sphere led to short-term economic gains for Hungarians, but created 
139  Ionescu, Jewish Resistance to “Romanianization” 1940–44, 186.
140  Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of  the European Jews, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 
5, 49–51.
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several detrimental social mechanisms that reinforced a vicious circle. The most 
important was the mechanism of  exploitation, meaning that Hungarians could 
live off  the work of  others by looting and robbing their property. The Hungarian 
state used formal and direct discrimination and seized all Jewish property in 
the name of  an anti-Semitically defi ned nation. The state redistributed property 
based on ethno-racial identity, which created a belief  among Hungarians that 
they would be rewarded in economic terms merely because of  their alleged 
ethno-national merits.
The relatively strong local support for and lack of  resistance against the 
deportation of  Jews was driven, above all, by the economic ambitions of  the 
local Hungarian community. Local Hungarians had economic incentives, namely 
the prospect of  being given property that the Jews had had to leave behind. 
Jews in the city trusted their leaders and stayed, despite warnings and rumors 
about mass murders. The economy was totally re-Hungarianized when the Jews 
were deported in the summer of  1944. However, the consequence was that 
the Hungarian economy and society was paralyzed. Hungarian leaders believed 
that the deportation of  Jews and the redistribution of  “Jewish property” would 
amount to “the salvation of  the Hungarian economy,” but instead the Holocaust 
became a dead-end of  human and material losses for everyone. The Holocaust in 
Hungary should therefore primarily be explained with local Hungarian economic 
motives, which overlapped with the Nazi German Final Solution. 
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